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Home equity insurance policies, policiesinsuring homeowners against declines in theprice
of their homes, would bear some resemblanceboth to ordinaiy insurance and to financialhedging
vehicles. A menu of choices for thedesign of such policies is presented here, andconceptual
issues are discussed. Choices include
pass-through futures and options, in which the insurance
company in effect serves as a retailer to homeowners of shortpositions in real estate futures
markets or of put options on real estate.Another choice is a life-event-triggeredinsurance
policy, in which the homeownerpays regular fixed insurance premia and is entitled toa claim
if both there is a sufficient decline in thereal estate price index and a specified lifeevent (such
as a move beyond a certain geographicaldistance) occurs. Pricing of the premia tocover loss
experience is derived, and tables of break-evenpolicy premia are shown, based on estimated
models of Los Angeles housing prices 1971-91.
Robert J. Shiller Allan N. Weiss
Cowles Foundation for Research President in Economics
Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.
Yale University 1698 Massachusetts Avenue 30 Hillhouse Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138 New Haven, CT 06520-8281
and NBERIn this paper we describe insurancepolicies to enable individuals toprotect
themselves against the risks of declines in theprice of their homes. As far as
we have been able to determine, there is noprecedent for true insurance
policies on home price.1 And yet, despite theneglect of such home equity
insurance policies in the past, these policies could beextremely important. The
risk of decline in the market value of homes is fargreater than the risk of fire
or other physical disaster; the potential significance ofan insurance industry
that protects market value of homes is muchlarger than that of the existing
homeowners property insurance industry.
Since such insurance products havenever really been attempted, there are
some fundamental problems to be worked out. Thereare two basic categories
of problems, which we willattempt to address here. The first is the economic
problem: creating policies that serve the particular needs ofhomeowners well.
We must make sure that the insurancepolicies cover as much of the home-
owners' risk as possible without creating excessivemoral hazard problems, and
that the policies appropriately address the owners'uncertainties about selling
the home or otherwise making use of the homeequity. The second is the
marketing problem, making the policies attractive to homeowners.Households
may have difficulties in dealing with speculative markets, difficulties in
confronting and managing speculative price movements. Policies thatare
attractive to homeowners could be designed to minimize thesedifficulties. We
may also include under the category of marketing problems the preconceived
notions among the general public andregulators as to what constitutes a
credible insurance policy; the public will bemore likely to buy a policy that
resembles others that they have learned toaccept.
1There are innovative homeequity assurance programs in the Chicago area,
see below. There are also shared-appreciationmortgages and risk-sharing
reverse mortgages.
1At the lime of this writing, derivative marketsfor real estate are being
developed.2 It is appropriate at this time to considerhow such markets could
be used to help insurance companies issue homeequity insurance policies, by
allowing the insurance companies to manage the risks thatthey incur by writ-
ing the policies. Still, we think that home equity insurancemight well be an
attractive product for insurance companies even if realestate derivative markets
fail to develop.
We do not believe that it is possible to settleat this time on a single kind
of insurance policy, and so we will heremerely offer a menu of alternatives,
listing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Indeed,ultimately, a number
of different kinds of policies wouldlikely be offered, to cater to the different
preferences and situations of different homeowners.
I. Basic Conceptual Issues
The insurance industry and the securities(and derivatives) industry are
essentially both in the same line of business —helpingpeople manage risks.
And yet the institutions arefundamentally different in these two industries.
One important difference is in thepayment structure of the risk-management
contracts. The insurance contractstraditionally pay out only when an unex-
pected casualty is incurred, usually arare event. In contrast, holders of
securities contracts in effect see the value of theiraccounts change (positively
and negatively) whenever the marketprice changes, in principle every minute
of the day.
2Some private riskmanagement policies for real estate have been imple-
mented. The London Futures andOptions Exchange attempted to start a
futures contract in residential andcommerciaJ real estate in 1991. Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc. and Aldrich, Eastman andWaltclh, L.P., in 1993 completed
a swap of commercial real estateappreciation for an interest rate. We are
working with the Chicago Board of Trade todevelop futures and options
products in real estate.
2Business events affecting the value ofsecurities, such as shares incorpor-
ations, are usually not sudden and are noteven objectively verifiable, andso
traditional insurance contracts cannot bewritten on these events.Thus, risk
management for owners of financial assets consistsnot of buying an insurance
policy against business risks to the finnsissuing the financial instruments, but
of hedging in financial markets. Theinvestor in a financialasset may take a
short position in a futures marketor buy a put option on the finaiicasset
held. The price movements in the financialmarkets create an objectivityto the
news, so that the owner of the financial assetcan in effect receivepayment on
a "claim" whenever bad economic news reachesthe market. Financial markets
thus in effect insure against badeconomic news even though thenews itself is
not objectively verifiable.
Most economic risks to the value of realestate, like the risks to values of
shares in corporations, areeveryday and hard-to-define events, andare inher-
ently similar to these financial risks, rather thanto risks that are traditionally
handled by insurance companies.Depending on how the contracts are struc-
tured, home equity insurance claimsmight tend, in effect, to comeevery day,
like returns on speculative assets.
Because of the tendency for houseprices to change gradually, traditional
insurance contracts cannot be written withoutsome attention to the nature of
the time-varying information about thelikelihood of claims. Consider insur-
ance policies insuring the risk of loss at time ofnext sale of the home for
which the homeownerpays a regular insurance premium. Such policies must
have some restrictions on the freedom ofinsurance companies to raise policy
premiums on existing policies. If insurancecompanies could raise premiums
on existing policies as much as they wanted wheneverthey wanted, then they
could raise the premium to such levelsas to force cancellation whenever
aggregate real estate price indexes had declined enough to make claimsappear
likely. The potential for such behavior of insurancecompanies would be to
3negate the insurance function of the policies. Designers ofinsurance policies
would have to impose some rigidity onpolicy premia or else abandon the con-
cept of charging a regular premium for insuring the risk of losson next sale
of the home. Imposing such rigidityon the policy premium makes the insur-
ance contract share some characteristics of aput option, in which the cost of
insurance is settled at the beginning of thecontract. As with the put option,
the insurance policy gains and loses valueas the home price falls or rises.
Even though risk management via homeequity insurance has resemblance
to risk management in financial markets, riskmanagement for real estate is
different from that of many otherspeculative assets, in that the market for real
estate is very difficult to trade in,very illiquid. The result of this lack of
liquidity is that the real estate market is notefficient; real estate prices are
somewhat forecastable. A price decline in thereal estate market may not be
"news," since price changes arepartly known in advance. If a price decline is
already expected, then insurance companiescannot insure it.
Forecastablity of Real Estate Price Changes
For the purpose of clarifying theimportance of the inefficiency of housing
markets for risk management,we estimated a simple forecasting model for real
estate prices using Los Angeles annualprice index data for each year 1971—
1991. The annual price indexwas the Case—Shiller quarterly price index for




Standard errors are shown inparentheses. Note that the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable issignificantly above zero, indicating that this price
series is not a randomwalk; rather, price changes tend to continuethrough
time, therefore there is inertia in realestate prices. Such inertia in real estate
4prices has been confirmed by Case and Shiller [1989,1990], Poterba [1991]
and Kuo [1993] for the United States, and Itoand Hirono [1993] for Japan.
This simple model implies an unconditionalmean annual log price increase
of 10.14% (computed from the above modelas 0.0371(1 —0.635)).It implies
that whenever the annual price change differsfrom that mean, then 0.63 5 (or
nearly 2/3) of that difference is expected to continue forthe next year. This
autoregressive model can also be written in movingaverage form:3
Mn(P1) —0.1014c1 + O.635e + 0.6352cc z + O.635312 + (2)
Since c1 is in this model serially independent,the variance of EilnP1 is thesum
of the variances of the terms on theright hand side; this sum equals (0.06821(1
—0.6352)or .0077. The one-year-ahead uncertainty aboutMnF, however, is
due only to uncertainty aboute, the lagged terms are already known. Thus,
the variance of the one-year-aheaduncertainty about iMnP1 is only .0682, or
.0046, only about 60% of the totaluncertainty of 0.0077. For this reason,
rolling over one-year risk management contractsmay fail to insure a substantial
part of the total risk, unless the quantity rolled over isgrossed up, as described
below. The situation is a little better withtwo-year contracts. At t—2, both c
and C1_1 are unknown; the total variance of thesetwo terms is .0066, or 86%
of the variance of one-year price change. Thisis a substantial improvement
in the fraction of the variance that isinsured; there is in this sense an
advantage to longer-horizon contracts.
With the particular stochasticprocess (1), it would still be possible for a
homeowner to hedge, even with short-termhedging vehicles, all of the risk of
31n using this model,we are disregarding measurement error in house price
indices, an error that introduces an errors-in-variablesproblem in the above
regression; see Case and Shiller [1989]. The annualchanges in the Los
Angeles price index here, however, arevery well measured, with standard
errors substantially less than one percent.
5price changes in the home by grossingup the hedging, by hedging more than
one home. Note that it follows from (2) that theinnovation at time tin
(natural) log price at time t+n, that isEln(P+) —Etiln(P+),equals
((l—p')/(l—p))c. Regardless of n, the innovation at timetisproportional to
r' but the larger n the higher the constant of proportionality. Thechange in
the futures price between t—l and tisby many models directly related to the
innovation at time tinthe price at the maturity of thecontract. Thus, shorter
horizon futures contracts could be used tohedge long horizon risk by just
hedging more (according to the constant ofproportionality) in the short con-
tracts than one would in longer contracts.However, stochastic models of price
other than (1) may not share thisimplication; if, for example, the model
implied that prices were fully known oneperiod ahead, then one-year futures
contracts would be useless for hedgingpurposes.
The predictability of real estateprices has the potential to complicate the
process of hedging real estate risk beyond the level ofcomplexity hedgers
already face in existing financial markets. Thisadded complexity might also
make it difficult for insurancecompanies to explain home equity insurance
contracts, which are analogous to these financialhedging vehicles, to their
public.
Liquidity and Time—Manaement Problems
A conventional futures marketrequires that contractors (both short and
long) post margin, and see theirmargin accounts debited and credited on a
daily basis in response to changes in thefutures price. Many people will find
it difficult to comeup with the cash for a margin account under tothy's insti-
tutional arrangement. Moreover,the bother of having to deal withmargin calls
is probably onerous forordinary households. Homeowners couldescape
frequent margin calls byposting a high initial margin, but posting largemargin
may be difficult for homeowners.
6Effective use of conventional financial hedging vehicles for riskman-
agement requires concentration and attention. For example, conventional
(American, exercisable on any date until the exercise date)put options have the
problem that the owner of the option must deal with the fact that itmay be
advantageous to exercise early, and the same would be true withput options
on real estate. In those times when real estate prices are expected to rise
through time, since the strike price is fixed through time, the put isexpected
to move out of the money, and holding a put option to maturity willgenerally
be a bad prospect; option holders must be prepared to exerciseearly. The
ability to exercise early creates problems for households, as they must then
monitor the put price and decide whether it is time to exerciseearly. The
problem could be prevented by making the put options European, i.e.,specify-
ing that they cannot be exercised early as can American options. But this
solution might not be a good one unless the options effectivelyare marketable,
since a homeowner who decides to move will then want toget out of the
option contract. And if the options are marketable, then the household begins
to see problems that resemble those of other speculative assets; homeowners
would feel the need to consider whether the option should be sold forspecula-
tive purposes; the option creates burdens of time and attention for households.
A household may not be able, in times of high risk to real estateprices,
to afford the price of a put option initially, and would be forced to buy theput
on margin. But this would then mean that the household would perhaps be
unable to meet margin calls.
Ultimately, it must be recognized that homeowners are not likely to begin
to behave like financial managers; they do not have the training or mental set
to behave so. Any product that is sold to them must be in effect managed for
them; the product must be designed so that little or no initiative is expected
from the homeowner.
Because of the difficulty of managing hedging vehicles, itmay be natural
7for households to buy or sell contracts only at the time ofpurchase or sale of
the home, or at the time of refinancing of theirmortgage. Given this, it would
be desirable to limit the risk management problem toone that appears only at
these times, and to combine the risk—managementcontracts with contracts that
are entered into at these times. At these times, the homeowner haslegal
counsel and advice of others that wouldnaturally be used to help make an
informed decision about risk management contractsas well. There are two
kinds of major contracts that a homeowner enters intoat this time: the
mortgage contract, and the homeowners insurance contract; either could be
attached to a home equity insurance policy, or thepolicy could be a separate
product that is marketed at this time. If home equity insurance isattached to
mortgages, then it might serve marketing to sell only down-payment insurance
on mortgages, rather than price insurance on homes. Thiscould mean that an
in-the-money put would have to be attached initially to thepolicy, and the put
would grow increasingly out-of-the-money, ifonly the downpayment is to be
insured, as the person pays off themortgage. The homeowner would have
only the initial downpayment protected, not the amortizationof the mortgage.
Restricting the policies in this way could bring down theircost, and facilitate
the marketing as part of amortgage.
Making Insurance Contracts Assumableor Transferable
In the public mind, there isa sharp distinction between speculative assets
and insurance policies. A homeequity insurance policy that too much re-
sembles a speculative assetmay not be accepted by the public, or regulators.
And yet, we want to avoidpolicy provisions that lock the homeowner into an
existing policy or home.
It is possible to make homeequity insurance policies effectively market-
able without turning them intospeculative assets that the homeowner might feel
the need to buy and sell often:make the policies assumable by the next
8purchaser of the home. If the insurance policy isassumable, then the new
homeowner would not have to payany additional or higher insurance premiums
than were specified under the original policy. Whenhome prices fall or are
expected to fall, the existing insurance policy may becomemore valuable, and
this extra value could become part of thepackage sold with the home.
Assumable fixed-rate conventional mortgageswere widely available until
a 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Fidelity Federal Savingsv. DeJa Cuesta)
ruled that lending institutions may enforce due-on-saleclauses. These mort-
gages became unavailable then, but they have since reappeared in 1993. Their
attractiveness to homebuyers is certainly enhancedby the low current market
interest rates, and this attractiveness is nowbeginning to be exploited.4
Assumable mortgages and assumable insurancecontracts are effectively
marketable by the homeowner only when the home issold, and this feature of
the mortgages intertwines the marketing of themortgage or insurance contract
with the marketing of the home. There is noappearance that any speculative
asset (other than the home) is being sold, and yet the sellingprice of the home
would generally be affected by the presence of an assumablepolicy, so that the
policy is effectively marketable as part of the home sale. An issue that would
arise, however, if these policies were marketable is that thenew owner of the
home would have to come up with the purchaseprice equal to the intrinsic
value of the home plus the present value of the assumablepolicy. Therefore,
the buyer would need to convince lenders of the value of thepolicy if it is to
serve as part of the collateral for the loan.
The issue of assumability of home equity insurance policies mirrors that
of the assumability of mortgages. Assumabilityprevents a locked-in effect,
wherein a homeowner may sometimes feel that he or she cannot move without
4DMR Financial Services in 1993 startedoffering assumable fixed-rate
conventional mortgages for midwestern homebuyers.
9losing a valuable contract. Making the policies assumable makes them serve
the homeowners' needs better, but on the other hand,makesthe policy
premium higher. The public reception of the insurance policies might be
maximized by offering both assumable and non-assumable policies (the former
having a higher premium) and letting the homeowner choose between them.
An alternative to making the insurance policy assumable is to make it
transferable when the homeowner moves. There would then have to bea
mechanism, specified in the original policy, that determined the provisions of
the transferred policy, so that the approximate value of the existingpolicy is
transferred to the policy on the new home. This mechanism might be related
to prices in futures or options markets for real estate; even though sucha
mechanism in the original policy connects the policy to speculativemarkets,
the relation is probably not one that would cause most homeownersto see their
policies as speculative assets.
Moral Hazard and Selection Bias Problems
In insuring the resale value of an individual home, the insurancecompany
must confront the fact that the value is influenced by a number of factors under
the control of the homeowner. Moreover, ininsuring the value of an individual
home, the insurance company mustworry that an unrepresentative sample of
homeowners will choose to become insured.
A homeowner who knows that all losses in value of thehome are borne
by the insurance company will have much reduced incentive to maintain the
home properly; this is the moral hazardproblem. To prevent this, there could
be terms in the insurance contract that allow the insurancecompany to reduce
payment on claims if there is evidence that the homeowner has not maintained
the property properly. S till, much of thevalue-maintaining activities that
should be undertaken by homeownersare not objectively verifiable. The dates
when many maintenance activities (suchas painting the home or replacing the
10roof) should be undertaken is a matter of judgment. Thusan insurance com-
pany may find it difficult to prove fault of the homeowner for not doing these
prior to sale of the home, even though failing to do thesemay adversely affect
the selling price of the home. A homeownermay redecorate or remodel the
home to idiosyncratic tastes, without concern for the resalevalue of the home,
and the loss of value on resale would be borne by the insurancecompany.
There is a selection bias problem in that a homeowner whofeels that he
or she paid too much for the home, and could not sell it for thesame price,
would have a special incentive to buy home equity insurance,thereby putting
the expected loss onto the insurancecompany. The impact of this selection
bias problem could be reduced if the insurancecompany were to require one
or more independent appraisals of the home value at the time the insurance
contract is initiated. However, the appraisers cannotcompletely solve the
selection bias problem, since they do not know all the factors thatcontribute
to home value. The appraisers mistakes will then tend to result in lossesto the
insurance company.
The combination of the moral hazard and selection biasproblem could
potentially make for very large losses to the insurance companies. Home-
owners who have an incentive to take advantage of home equity insurance
programs could seek out such policies, and then poorly maintain their homes.
There could even be non-arms-length purchases and sales at nonmarketprices,
to defraud the insurance companies. Vigilance would have to be maintained
about all these potential problems, and such vigilance will impose costs on the
insurance companies.
Both the moral hazard and selection bias problems can be reduced, though
not eliminated, by coinsurance, by offering only policies in which the home-
owner shares part of the loss. The selection bias problem can also be reduced
somewhat by making sure that policies are evenly geographically distributed,
and not concentrated in certain neighborhoods.
11Another way of dealing with these problems is to offer insurance not on
the change in price of the individual home, but on the change in a real estate
index for the neighborhood in which the home is situated. The index could
also be made specific to the type (e.g., whether house or condominium) or size
of the home. This method ought to completely eliminate the moral hazard
problem and, so long as even geographical and type distribution is maintained,
the selection bias problem as well. Such policies would bevery inexpensive
to offer, as no appraisals and no monitoring of the homeowner's behavior, are
needed. The insurance company might completely diversify risk in derivative
markets cash settled based on the real estate price indices. A disadvantage of
this method is that the geographical indices make some errors in predicting in-
dividual home price changes, so that the homeowner is notcompletely insured
against losses on sale of the home.
The two methods of dealing with these problems could also be combined:
there could be complete insurance of the price change that is due toaggregate
market conditions and coinsurance for the deviation of the homeprice from the
price change inferred by the index.
In what follows, we will assume that the home equity insurancepolicy is
based on the change in the real estate price index, and noton the price of the
individual home.
Cancelability of Policies
Conventional insurance policies can be cancelled at will by thepurchaser.
It would seem natural, therefore, to make theproposed new policies cancelable
at any time too. However, making policies cancelable introducesa new ele-
ment of uncertainty for insurance companies, that of predicting whenpolicy-
holders will cancel. This uncertainty for insurancecompanies mirrors the
uncertainty that mortgage lenders face in predicting when homeowners will
prepay their mortgages. For mortgage lenders, prepayment uncertainty is a risk
12that cannot be hedged well on conventional interest rate futuresor options
markets. By the same token, cancellation uncertainty is a risk thatcannot be
hedged well by insurance companies on real estate price futures or options
markets.
The uncertainty about cancellation of real estate price insurancepolicies
may be especially difficult to deal with because it may reflect strategic be-
havior on the part of homeowners. Homeowners may cancel theirpolicies just
when real estate price indexes have risen a lot, suggesting that it isunlikely
that they will have a claim under the original policy. Theymay also at times
suspect that real estate prices will rise; since real estate markets are essentially
inefficient, and since real estate prices show some inertial behavior as we have
seen, there may be times when they have good reason to know that they
should cancel.If insurance companies had previously contracted under
assumptions that people would not cancel, they may suffer a serious loss.
Indexation of Policy Premiums and Floors
Ideally, policies should be fully indexed for inflation, as measured by a
cost of living index such as the consumer price index. The policy should
insure against real, not nominal loss in value of the home, and the insurance
premium should be specified in real terms.
Now, most contracts today do not involve cost-of-living clauses, and so
one might imagine that the market is not ready for such clauses. But, the
importance of providing for changes in the cost of living is not so important
for other kinds of insurance as it is for home price insurance. The most
common risk that people face with their homes in an inflationary economy is
not that nominal home prices will fall, but that the nominal home prices will
not keep up with the cost of living. In, let us say, a period of 10% inflation
as measured by the cost of living, a homeowner whose property did not
13increase would find that there were substantial real losses, that wouldnot have
been insured by a policy on nominal prices.
Ideally, the indexation of policy provisions should be madepart of the first
standard policy that is offered, and not be made just anoption. The general
public is likely to purchase the inflation protection only if it is presented as the
recommended choice, not just as another option. Ata time of major
institutional change, we should try to get the initialcontracts specified
optimally, so that imitators will be more likely to follow this course. On the
other hand, it may be harder to market indexed policiesinitially because they
will tend to have higher policy premia in aninflationary economy.
The importance of indexation to the homeownermay depend in part on
whether the homeowner has a fixed-rate or floating ratemortgage. With a
fixed rate mortgage, the debt is defined in nominalterms, and so it may be
more natural to insure the nominal value of the home. Withfloating rate
mortgages, where the interest rate responds to news about inflation, the debt
is more nearly defined in real terms, and then thehomeowner may wish to
have an insurance policy defined in real terms.
H. Antecedents of Home Equity Insurance
We have not heard ofany prior attempts to create comprehensive insurance
against declines home equity, but there have beenattempts by local
governments in the Chicago area to offer insurance againstpart of the risks to
home equity.5 In 1978 the village of Oak Parkillinois, a suburb of Chicago,
created an "equity assurance" plan in whichparticipating homeowners who
have been enrolled for at least fiveyears are reimbursed, when they sell their
5The shared-appreciationmortgages (see Ballew [1988]) and risk-sharing
reverse mortgages (see Scholen [1993], Passell [1994]) haveaspects of home
equity insurance in them. Both are potentiallyimportant institutions for price
risk management; neither hasyet become a nationally significant institution.
14home, for 80% of the loss incurred if the home was sold for less than the
appraised value and if the loss was not due to an extended decline in the
metropolitan area. The participating homeowner is not chargedany insurance
premium, and must pay only a $90.00 fee for the initial appraisal; theprogram
is financed by a small tax levy on all property owners in thevillage. This
program was created as part of a concerted effort by the village to prevent
neighborhood decline at a time of racial change, an effort that also included
such other measures as prohibition of for-sale signs, villageinspections of
exteriors of homes, and laws against realtors' steering of homebuyers,see
Goodwin [19791.
A similar program, the "home equity assurance program"was created by
a voter referendum in the city of Chicago in 1987 and began in 1990. It
insures participating homeowners against all of the decline in value that is due
to changes in neighborhood conditions. With this program,any precinct that
voted to participate in the program has had an insurance fee, $6 to $25 de-
pending oii appraised value, added to the tax bill of each resident. However,
only those homeowners in the precinct who have individually enrolled in the
program and paid for an appraisal (at $150) are covered by the insurance.
Those who enroll in the program have the right, after fiveyears, to be
reimbursed for any loss due to decline in neighborhood conditions. As with
the Oak Park program, the program insures homeowners only against price
declines due to changes that are isolated to that neighborhood. The law that
created the program states that the program does not insure againstany
municipal-wide decline in value. In a sense, the Chicago program (like the
Oak Park program) is the complement of, rather than substitute for, the index-
based home equity insurance proposed here: the program explicitly excludes
the risks that we propose to insure.
The Oak Park Program has never yet had a single claim; there has been
no major price decline in Oak Park since the beginning of the program. Since
15the Chicago program has not existed for five years yet, there have been no
claims there either. The experience of these programs thus does little to
establish the viability of privately-issued home equity insurance.
The primary motivation for the Chicago area programs was to stem the
outflow of responsible residents due to declining neighborhood quality. The
hope was to break the vicious circle whereby an initial decline in neighborhood
quality causes people to try to sell for fear of home price declines, thereby
lowering the prices of homes, discouraging homeowner's investment in their
own neighborhood, and therefore generating more declines in neighborhood
quality. Such a vicious circle is widely held to be a mechanism whereby good
neighborhoods are converted into slums.6 As such, and with thevery low
premiums, the programs are more naturally city, rather than private, initiatives.
The Chicago experience, while innovative, does notappear to be a reliable
model for private insurers to follow. Whether a home's price fell due toa
decline in neighborhood quality is avery subjective notion; there will in-
evitably be disputes. The Chicago programs have not been tested enough to
represent a valid precedent for other policies.
The Chicago programs have been a modest success inone sense: about
three percent of eligible homeowners in Chicago haveparticipated in the
programs, about one to two percent of homeowners in Oak Park have partici-
pated. Still, while a few percent is enough of the population to make such
programs worthwhile, we might hope for more participation. The Chicago area
programs define the risks too narrowly, to exclude losses due to changes in
market conditions. Theprograms were not managed by professional private
insurance companies, and there are no financial incentivesprovided to realtors,
lawyers or mortgage lenders to enroll homeowners in theprogram. The
programs have no comniission salesmen; homeowners must themselves take the
6See Kelly [1991] fora discussion of these claims.
16initiative to enroll. Many homeowners have been under the mistaken
impression that they are automatically enrolled. Moreover, some homeowners
have been deterred from taking action to enroll out of fear that having their
home reappraised might result in a higher assessed value and therefore higher
property taxes. The public demand for home equity insurance might be much
greater with policies marketed well by private insurers.
III. Pass—Through Futures and Options
The home equity insurance products that offer the least risk to the insur-
ance companies are those in which the insurance company is able to sell off
the risk that they incur in writing the policies. If, as we expect will happen
before too long, there are futures and options markets on real estate price
indices, then an insurance company could create insurance products that are
based on the contracts traded in such markets passed through to the home-
owner. While at the present time there are likely to be regulatory obstacles to
insurance companies serving as retailers of futures and options products, it is
still important to consider the concept of such policies, leaving regulatory
issues to later discussion.
The simple pass—through futures and options insurance policies would con-
stitute the marketing, by the insurance companies, of the kinds of real estate
contracts that we envision may shortly be trading at the Chicago Board of
Trade. If the insurance companies are essentially selling market-traded con-
tracts to the public, then they may completely hedge, in the options markets,
their underwriting risks related to these insurance policies.
With the pass—through futures, homeowners will see their accounts debited
or credited every day depending on the change in the real estate futures price
on which their policy is based. Such insurance policies would get homeowners
completely out of price risk on their homes, both on the upside and the down-
17side. Such insurance contracts are potentially useful to homeowners, but there
may be some resistance among homeowners to giving up the upside potential
of their homes, resistance to paying money to the insurance company if the
values of their home increase. Such policies sound very unlike existing
insurance policies.
With the pass—through options, homeowners keep the upside potential for
appreciation of their homes, and are effectively insured against losses.
Homeowners may be offered by their homeowners insurance company, or via
their mortgage lender at the time that they buy their home, put options on real
estate price indices in their city, in proportion to the purchase price of their
home. Let us suppose that the put options have a maturity of two years. At
the end of two years, the payout by the insurance company would be exactly
the decline in value of their home (as inferred using the price of the home at
the time the insurance policy was written and the city-wide index of home
prices) below the exercise price, or floor, of the option. If the price of the
home (inferred by the index) did not fall below the floor, the homeowner
would not have a claim. The payment would be made ultimately by the writer
of the option, not the insurance company, which only passes through thepay-
ment. Thus, the insurance company incurs no risk in writing these policies.
The two-year maturity for the option was suggested for this example
because, as seen with our simple forecasting model equation (1), most of the
two-year-ahead price change is unknown today. This time horizon also seemed
a good choice for our example, since most people would not want to sell a
home in much less than two years from the time of purchase, and twoyears
represents something like the time frame for planning whether to move or not.
Of course, there is no reason why they would not want a longer insurance
horizon than their planning horizon, but the two-year (or perhaps three- or four-
year) horizon may have a sort of intuitive attractiveness to it, we think, and this
is what matters for marketingpurposes. Many existing market-traded options
18are tradedwith two-year horizons.
The pricing of options on real estate price indices introducessome diffi-
culties not encountered in pricing options on securities. We cannotuse the
conventional Black—Scholes [1973J option pricing formula or itsanalogues
to price these, since these formulas rely on the fundamental assumption that the
price of the underlying asset is a Markov process. With the Black—Scholes
formula, the price of the option depends only on the current price, not lagged
price, of the underlying asset, but clearly prices of options on real estate will
depend also on the recent trend in prices. There is also another problem with
the Black—Scholes analysis. The Black—Scholes formula also relies on the
assumption that costless continuous arbitrage is possible between the option
market and the market for the underlying asset: with real estate thisassump-
tion is obviously unacceptable; transactions costs in real estate are enormous.
The derivation of prices of options on assets whose returns are predictable
here differs from that proposed by Lo and Wang [1994], who used an arbitrage
pjicing argument to derive their option prices. They noted that the original
arbitrage pricing formulation of Black and Scholes [19731 still provides the
same option price for given variance of returns even if expected returns are
predictable; options prices are not affected by expected returns, or by lagged
returns, once the underlying price is given. However, this conclusion follows
from the assumption that the underlying asset price is costlessly tradable and
is Markov. Under their assumptions, it follows that the option price is a simple
nonlinear transformation of the price of the underlying (and time) and hence
will generally tend to share, in a sense, any inefficiencies that are found in the
underlying market. This conclusion is strongly at odds with our presumption
that transactions costs are much lower in the options market than they are in
the real estate market. The same inefficiencies should not be expected in both
7See also Ingersoll [1987].
19markets. It is of course possible that the creation of a derivative market in real
estate or of home equity insurance might alter the stochastic properties of home
prices, and might make home prices more efficient.
To price the real estate options, we will use here, in the tradition of the
early literature on options pricing of Sprenkle [1961], Boness [1964] and
Samuelson [1967], the simple assumption that the value of the European option
is just the present value of the expected payout and the assumption that prices
are lognormally distributed. The formula we derive will also have an interpre-
tation in terms of the more modem theory of options pricing Out of equilibrium
of Constantinides [1978] and McDonald and Siegel [1984].8 To derive this
present value, we use the expression for the truncated mean E(z; z <a) for the








where N() is the cumulative normal distribution function. The present value
of the expected payout of the put option is the present value of the exercise
price times the probability of exercise minus the present value of the expected
price of the underlying when the option is exercised. The probability of exer-
cise is the probability that the price of the underlying is less than X; this prob-
ability can be calculated using the ordinary cumulative normal distribution
function. The present value of the price of the underlying when the option is
exercised is derived by substituting values for p. (the expected change in the log
real estate price index between today and t periods from today) and d(the
variance of the change in the log real estate price index between today and t
survey of the issues here, where the underlying market may not be
efficient or in equilibrium, may be found in O'Brien and Selby [19861.
20periods from today) into the above equation and using X, the strike price, for
a, and premultiplying by the discount factore where risthe discount rate
and tisthe lime to maturity. This gives us our real estate put option price w:





where P is the price of the underlying (here, the price of the home as inferred
by the real estate price index) at the present time. A similar expression, based
on a somewhat different time series model, appears in Sutton [1994]. Note that
the formula (4) reduces to the usual Black—Scholes [1973] put option pricing
formula in the case where the underlying asset is expected to earn the risk-free
rate, i= rt—&t/2and a2 =&t where2isthe variance in the Black—
Scholes formula. As we shall apply this formula, however, we will take .tto
be the expected log price change between now and Iperiodsin the future
according to an autoregressive model of the log real estate price index, as for
example equation (1) above. The formula (4) also reduces to the McDonald
and Siegel [1984] pricing formula for options whose underlying asset earns a
below-equilibrium rate of return if their equilibrium rate of return equals the
risk-free rate.
Let us now do pricing of one- and two-year options described above in
terms of the information we have in lagged price changes, as well as the
model, given in equation (1) above, of real estate price indices. In the auto-
regressive model Mn(P) =pln(P1_1)+c+c,with error variance a, when
we know the log price change over the preceding year then the expected total
growth over the next year is x =pMn(P_l)+cand over the next two years is
=(p+p2)iMn(P1)+(2+p)c, andvariance of the log price change over
one year is a2 =overtwo years is a2 =(2÷ 2p +p2)a.
Table 1 shows the one-year, and Table 2 the two-year put option prices at
21time tforvarious values of the just-observed price change Mn(P1). Note that
a two-year put is not always more expensive than a one-year put with the same
exercise price. These, or course, are European puts, that cannot be exercised
until the exercise date, reflecting our assumption that homeowners will not be
bothered with the problems of managing early exercise. With European
options, extra time to exercise is not always a benefit, since the longer maturity
may force one to postpone exercise until a less advantageous time.
Note that some of the option prices are quite high: when prices have been
dropping and when the exercise price is very high, the price of the put must of
course be high, since in these cases the purchaser of the option (homeowner)
can expect to be paid a large sum in two-year's time. It would seem likely that
marketing of options to the general public would be more successful with some
of the less expensive options. Some of the options prices are quite low. For
example, in a year when prices were unchanged, a two-year put option with an
exercise price of $90,000 (corresponding to an insurance policy with a $10,000
deductible) need cost only $255 dollars at time of purchase, or, one might say,
$128 per year of the two-year option. The insurancecompany could charge
this price, plus an implicit fee, for expenses, which we disregard in our
calculations here, and call it an insurance premium. Homeowners can have
'peace of mind' against price drops for a small sum.
Even an at-the-money two-year put option for a $100,000 home, corres-
ponding to no deductible at all, would only cost, at a time when prices were
unchanged, $1429 dollars, $715 per year for the two years of the option. This
put price may seem low at first glance for insuring a $100,000 home against
any price loss (due to aggregate market conditions). It should be remembered,
however, that in terms of actual loss experience in Los Angeles losses of any
substantial magnitude have been rare, and those losses that did occur tended to
be preceded by prior price declines.
An insurance company might then function as a sort of portfolio manager
22for the puts, collecting from the homeowner each year an amount of money
that guarantees the floor value for the home for the next two years. If they are
to keep the homeowners as continuing customers, this means that the insurance
company might suggest each subsequent year that the person pay an additional
policy premium, and thereby extend the insurance for an additional year. After
the first year has elapsed, the original two-year put has been reduced to a one-
year put; the insurance company can charge for replacing this with a new two-
year put.
Let us trace through a couple of scenarios. Suppose that after a year of
unchanged prices a homeowner purchased a two-year put on a $100,000 home
with a strike price of $90,000 for the $255 shown in Table 2. Now suppose
that log house prices fell by 10%, so that the individual's home fell in value
to $90,484. Then the two-year put turns into a nearly-at-the-money one-year
put worth $2,971 (this number can be crudely approximated from Table I by
multiplying $3,585 times .90484); the put is worth much more since it is now
at-the-money; there is no longer a deductible when viewed from the new home
price. In year 1 the price of an at-the-money two-year European put for a
$90,484 home with strike price of $90,000 is $3,868. To extend the option
from one year to two, the homeowner would need to pay $3,868 —$2,971=
$897,or $449 for each of the two years remaining. This kind of additional
premium may be attractive to homeowners who have just seen the value of
their homes fall by 10%.
Alternatively, suppose that, after the homeowner initially purchased the
10,000 deductible policy when the home was worth $100,000, log home prices
increased the next year by 10%. The home, purchased originally for $100,000,
is now worth, as inferred from aggregate price indices, $110,517. Then the
market price of the two-year put for which the homeowner paid $255, now a
one-year put, has fallen, from equation (4), to $0: the exercise price is now
much further below the price of the home, and moreover, the price increases
23portend more price increases. The loss of the $255 of course represents the
cost of insurance for the past year, when there was a gain rather than a loss on
the home. The homeowner is now still insured for another year, but with
prices rising, a fall below $90,000 is now extremely unlikely. In this case, it
is plausible that an insurance salesman could contact the homeowner for some
updating of the policy. At this time, the homeowner might find attractive
trading in the old policy for a new policy insuring the $110,517 home against
any decline below $110,000; the price of such a policy would be, by equation
(4), $295. Again, of course, the insurance company would also collect a fee,
to cover expenses, for this service, which we neglect in our calculations.
The scenarios we havejust described depict the rolling-over of overlapping
relatively short-term puts on the home price. We think that there is plausibly
a market for such insurance policies, though only a market test could prove
this.
Rolling over short-term puts, however, is not the same as purchasing a
single put that expires on the date that the homeowner ultimately sells. The
short-horizon insurance premia are as high as they are relative to longer-
horizon premia in part because there is a chance that home prices will decline
in the next two years, and then, beyond two years, rise back to the initial price
before the individual sells. One who had followed the rolling-over of puts may
receive a payment for loss after two years, even though there was no ultimate
loss, and the initial premium must be high enough so that the insurance
company can make these unnecessary payments for such losses. Homeowners
may well want to purchase a put option whose exercise date coincides with
some life event that relates to their purchase of sale of real estate: for
example, they may want an option that matures when they ultimately sell the
home and move a distance away. Unfortunately, they do not know when they
will ultimately sell and move. But, to the extent that these life events are
exogenous random events, the insurance company can pool the risk of uncer-
24tainty about exercise dates; this brings us to life—event—triggered insurance
policies.
IV. Life—Event—Triggered Insurance Policies
With a life—event—triggered insurance policy, the homeowner will receive
payment from the insurance company only when there is indeed a loss expen-
enced by the homeowner. A loss is defined as a situation in which a life event
(such as a move to another city) causes the homeowner to suffer from declin-
ing prices; normally price declines have no effect on homeowners who continue
to live in the same homes. To the homeowner, such a policy is in effect a put
option whose exercise date is contingent on this life event, although of course
the insurance policies would not likely be called put options to the homeowner.
Insurance companies might be able to charge even lower premiums for
life—event—triggered insurance policies than they would for the pass—through
options described above, since the life events on which claims are contingent
may be fairly rare. Consider a policy for which the life event is defined as the
sale of the home. Insuring against losses on sale dates may not be very expen-
sive for insurance companies, if sale dates are randomly distributed, since few
people buy at the peak of the market and also sell at the trough.
To give some preliminary indication of the loss experience that insurance
companies can expect, we have computed the average annual total claim per
home sold twice for insurance policies on $100,000homesin Los Angeles and
New York, where the life event is defined as any sale of the house. We are
assuming that the insurance company pays a claim to the homeowner when the
homeowner experiences a loss between sales as defined by the index, and when
the loss is beyond the deductible. The quarterly data set for both cities runs
from 1985 first quarter to 1993 third quarter, a time period that includes some
striking price drops in Los Angeles. From the peak in the Los Angeles market
25in the second quarter of 1990 until the end of the time period, the index
declined 21.8%. (The peak to trough decline in the New York index in this
sample was 10.3%). A homeowner who purchased a home in Los Angeles for
$100,000 in the second quarter of 1990 and sold again in the third quarter of
1993 would have lost, according to this index, $21,800. A $10,000 deductible
policy would pay a claim of $11,800 to this homeowner. And yet, the overall
loss experience for an insurance company would be drastically smaller than this
sale pair would suggest, since this time interval is only one of hundreds of
possible time intervals between sales. Table 3 gives the annual average claim
(loss beyond the deductible between sales when there is a loss, otherwise zero,
divided by 4.17, the average interval between sales) on the assumption that all
of the 378 possible sales intervals greater than or equal to two years that are
contained within the range of 1985 first quarter to 1993 third quarter occur
with equal frequency. The average claim for a $10,000 deductible policy is
only $144 per year for Los Angeles and less than $1 per year for New York.
The policy premiums could be indeed even lower given that many homes did
not sell twice in this period. The policy premiums would be yet lower if the
life event definition were to exclude some sales, as sales to buy a nearby home.
This simple analysis is meant to be suggestive only; we now turn to formal
modeling of the insurance costs.
We envision life—event—triggered insurance policies as resembling ordinary
insurance policies in many details. The homeowner pays a fixed annual premi-
um until the homeowner decides to cancel; the homeowner is free to cancel at
any time. Coverage continues against losses until the homeowner cancels the
policy. The policy has a deductible, which defines a floor below which the
policy starts to pay out. The floor is the price of the homes at the time the
insurance policy was taken out minus the deductible. If the price of the home,
as inferred by the initial price corrected by an index of neighborhood real
estate prices in that homes price tier, falls below the original price minus the
26deductible, and if the homeowner is eligible for a claim on that date, as when
the homeowner must move and sell, then the insurance Company pays the loss
below the floor (as inferred from the price index) to the homeowner and the
policy is cancelled. To the extent that the dates at which homeowners become
eligible for claims (as by moving) are known, the insurance company, in writ-
ing the policies, is in effect writing a number of real estate put options with
various exercise dates. The exercise dates would be the dates of eligibility for
claims.
It was noted above that it would not make sense to create policies in which
the insurance provider has unrestricted ability to change policy premia on
existing policies; they would rationally raise premia whenever the real estate
price index appeared to be approaching a level at which claims would be paid.
We suppose here that the insurance company cannot change the policy premi-
um after the policy is first issued.
Of course, homeowners choose when to sell, and might do so strategically,
to take advantage of insurance companies; for the put option interpretation the
exercise date may in effect be stochastic and influenced by market prices. But
homeowners' willingness to sell for such a reason is likely to be limited, and
the policy may be so written that they cannot use their insurance unless they
have a real loss. For example, claims generated by home sales may be
restricted to instances in which the individual moves more than some threshold
distance, say 50miles.Or, the policy may pay a claim only if the person
moves to another area where real estate prices have not fallen as much; the
claim could be based on the difference between the price behavior in the region
of the insured property and the region to which the homeowner moves. Such
restrictions on a policy makes it into a life—event—triggered insurance policy,
in that it compensates only for actual losses, and at the same time may make
it possible for insurance companies to offer the policies at a lower premium.
A concern is that, even if we try hard to define life events that appear to
27be beyond the control of policyholders, some policyholders may somehow still
manage to influence the life events so that they can collect For example, a
homeowner might deliberately move more than the threshold distance to
collect. Liquidity-constrained policyholders may be especially likely to do so.
On the other hand, policy holders who are not liquidity constrained may feel
no urgency to move in order to collect, knowing that they can do so at any
future time. Realistically, we think that, although insurance companies must
expect some losses due to policyholders' influencing life events, life events can
be defined so that most homeowners will not alter the events in order to
collect.
To the extent that life events are really exogenous and predictable for the
average policyholder, and if puts of all the relevant maturities were traded in
the options markets, then the insurance company that writes the policies could
hedge its risk of losses by buying the puts whose expiration dates correspond
to expected the life—event dates. Hedging the risk by buying puts eliminates
all real estate price risk to the insurance company. It does not, of course,
eliminate risks due to the uncertainty about the aggregate frequency of life
events. Thus, hedging such insurance risk with real-estate put options is
analogous to hedging mortgage portfolios in the treasury bond futures markets.
In both case, a price risk is hedged, but a risk as to the cancellation behavior
of homeowners is not hedged (in the mortgage case, this is prepayment risk).
In practice, while there has been talk of creating puts on residential real
estate, long-horizon puts may not be traded soon. Other risk-management
techniques can be used by issuers of the insurance policies: the insurance
companies can try to diversify the geographic regions in which policies are
issued, can limit the quantity of such policies. Moreover, dynamic hedging
strategies involving real estate futures markets might be used to simulate the
put options, or policies could be securitized and sold, or real estate swap
agreements could be entered into.
28In order to get a rough indication of the premiums required on such poi-
icies, and to get some idea how insurance companies should price such policies
in the absence of real estate put option markets, which do not yet exist, we
have computed break-even policy premiums using the assumption that the cost
of providing the policies is given by the price of the portfolio of put options
that the policy represents under the assumptions about eligibility of claims just
described, and using our put pricing formula (4) and equation (1).
For this exercise, we suppose that a fixed proportion a of all policies are
canceled by the policyholders each period, because of such factors as moves
(whether beyond the threshold distance or not). Moreover, we assume that a
proportion b of all policyholders at a given time become eligible for a claim
each year (as by moving more than a threshold distance), and receive a claim
if the price index has fallen enough to indicate that their home value is less
than the floor, and cancel their policies. Clearly, under these assumptions b is
less than a, since not all cancellations are incurred at times when the person is
eligible for a claim. The insurance company would thus have b times the value
initially insured in all homes for which policies were written in one-year puts,
(1—a) times b in two-year puts, (1—a)2 times b in three-year puts, and so on.
Let us suppose that the insurance company invests all policy premia in a
riskiess asset that pays the interest rate r.Thetotal value of all the puts
(relative to the value of the initially insured housing) can then be found by
creating a weighted sum of the put prices with these portfolio values (b,
(l—a)b, ...)asweights. Let us use C to denote this weighted sum generated
using (4) above:
C b(1-a)1w(t,X,F, t,, r) (5)
where isgenerated recursively starting with Po =0by=
+ it where =pp+c and =MnP,and where is also
generated recursively starting with y= 0by CT= + d wherec =
29c((l_pt)/(l_p))2.9 The present value of a $1 per year insurance premium,
starting today andcontinuingeach year until cancellation, is V =1/(1-(1-a)d)
where d is the discount factor, d =1/(1+r)where risthe interest rate. The
required annual premium for a single home, so that the insurance company can
expect to break even in terms of loss experience with these policies, is then
c/V.
Asa way of getting some rough indication of the parameters a and b, we
turn to U.S. Census data on population mobility. In 1992, the total U.S.
population in owner-occupied units was 165.61 million persons, of these 14.79
million, 8.93% of the total, moved; a first guess at the parameter a would thus
be 8.93%. To get an indication of the parameter b, we note that 5.87 million,
3.54% of the total population in owner-occupied units, moved to another
county, and 2.81 million, 1.70% of the total population in owner-occupied
units, moved to another state.m Thus, a first guess for the parameter a
would be 3.54% or 1.70%, depending on the distance threshold the move that
defines eligibility.
The cancellation rate a might differ from the 8.93% for several reasons.
Notably, people may have reasons other than a move to cancel their insurance
policy. This consideration suggests that the cancellation rate might be higher
than 8.93%. Moreover, the census figures represent moves by individuals, not
sales of homes. Some of the moves are the result of children growing up and
moving out to live on their own; this consideration suggests that the cancel-
lation rate might be less than 8.93%.
Eligibility for insurance claims should not be triggered by a move to
9As above, these parameters refer to the autoregressive model LMn(P) =
pln(P_1)+c+ewith error variance ,asexemplified by equation (1).
10See Hansen [1993], Table B, page IX.
30another county or state, since some people live on the border of counties or
states, and such moves may be short-distance. Often, long-distance moves
occur at times of family breakup, and in these times not all members of the
family move far away; some work would have to be done defining more pre-
cisely how to define eligibility for insurance claims. Thus, we cannot translate
the Census figures into any clear indication of the parameter a. For the pur-
poses of our simulations, let us merely assumethat the distance requirement
is set at such a level that only 3% of households are eligible for claims each
year. Moreover, let us assume that9% of all households cancel each year.
Table 4 shows the simulated break-even premia in markets in which the aggre-
gate price change had various values in the preceding year.
Some of the estimated premiums may seem implausibly small. Note from
Table 4 that even for a zero deductible, the fixed annual premium initiated in
a period of stable prices to insure a $100,000 home forever is only $33 per
year. How can the insurance company afford toinsure a $100,000 home for-
ever against price declines for only $33, when the standard deviation ofthe log
price residual in the first-order autoregressive model (1) is 6.8%in the first
year alone? The premium is so lowsince most homeowners will not actually
sell within the time that home prices are likely to be low, and for most home-
owners inflation will eventually push their home prices well abovethe floor
price.
The assumption that the model (1) will continue to hold indefinitely might
be questioned; many believe that we have entered a low-inflation monetary
policy regime that will have permanently lower inflation rates.Moreover,
some might question the assumption that only 9% of policyholderswill cancel
per year. Table 5 was producedin the same way as Table 4 but with the
alternative assumption that the long-mn inflation rate is only 3% per yearand
the cancellation rate was much higher, at 15% per year. That is, theconstant
term in equation (1) was lowered from .037 to (1_-0.635)*.03 =0.011,and the
31parameter a was raised to 15%; all other parameters wereleft unchanged. The
break-even annual policy premiums look somewhat higher, but there are still
some policies that are quite reasonably priced: for example, azero-deductible
policy issued in a time of stable prices is still only $145 per year.
The annual policy premium calculations presented here are meant only to
be illustrative; much further work remains to be done to refine the forecasting
model for real estate prices and to estimate probabilities of cancellation.
V. Conclusion
The simple insurance policies that we called pass—through futures and
options, but which need not be so described to the public, may wellbe attrac-
tive, easily marketed, and easy to risk-manage for insurance companies.On
the other hand, our life—event—triggered insurance policies, that look more like
conventional insurance policies, may be even more attractive to the public,
albeit harder for insurance companies to hedge. We feel that the life—event—
triggered insurance policy described above, in which the household seesitself
insured against losses connected with defined life events, may be an important
option for initiating home equity insurance, in terms of its general
marketability, serviceability, and acceptability to insurance regulators. The
life—event—triggered insurance policies will not cover households against all
consequences of price declines in real estate, but the policiesdo significantly
improve the households' ability to manage their risks.
32Table 1
One-Year Put Option Prices for $100,000 Home








$45 $1,546 $7,714 $16,321
—10% $3 $321 $3,585 $11,088 $19,860
0% 0 $35 $1,075 $6,057 $14,225
10% 0 $2 $181 $2,304 $8,550
20% 0 0 $16 $526 $3,788
The parameter X is the strike price or exercise price of the option, the par-
ameter iMn(P11) is the actual change in log price over the preceding year.For
these calculations, the interest rate rwas6% and the one-year-ahead standard
deviation of price was 6.78%.
Source: These calculations depend on the first-order autoregressive modelfor
changes in log price, equation (1) in the text as well as the options pricing
formula, equation (4).
33Table 2
Two-Year Put Option Pricesfor $100,000 Home






—20% $929 $4,009 $9,939 $17,771 $26,374
—10% $176 $1,261 $4,518 $10,366 $18,029
0% $20 $255 $1,429 $4,590 $10,124
10% $1 $31 $291 $1,404 $4,428
20% 0 $2 $36 $275 $1,215
The parameter X is the strike price or exercise price of the option, the par-
ameter LMn(P_l) is the actual change in log price over the preceding year. For
these calculations, the interest rate r was 6% and the one-year-ahead standard
deviation of price was 6.78%.
Source:Thesecalculations depend on the first-order autoregressive model for
changes in log price, equation (1) in the text as well as the options pricing
formula, equation (4).
34Table 3
Break-Even Analysis on Loss Experience
for Selected Markets
Annual Costs for a $100,000 Home Deductible
$5,000 $10,000 $20,000
Metropolitan Areas UsingActual Indices
$144 $3 Los Angeles 1985—93 $292
New York 1985—93 $158 0 0
Note: Figures give average claim per home sold twice assuming a claim is
paid whenever a home is sold at a loss beyond the deductible after two or more
years, assuming all possible intervals greaterthan two years are equally
represented. The price indices are the quarterly Case Shiller HomePrice
Indices for the metropolitan areas.
35Table 4
Calculations of Annual Premium for
Life—Event—Triggered Home Equity Insurance
Initial Home Price $100,000
As Function of Log Price Change over Previous Year








—20% $34 $56 $89 $136 $196
—10% $12 $20 $34 $57 $92
0% $4 $6 $11 $19 $33
10%
•
$1 $2 $3 $5 $9
20% 0 0 $1 $1 $2
Notes: These figures were produced using equation (5) shown in the text using
equations (1) and (4) to produce C, and dividing by V, the expected present
value of policy premiums, under the assumption that 9% of homeowners move
(and then cancel) and that 3% of homeowners are eligible for a claim by virtue
of life event, each year. The figures give the annual premium such that the
insurance company will expect to break even, in consideration of loss
experience only, on this policy.
36Table 5
Calculationsof Annual Premium for
Life—Event—Triggered Home Equity Insurance
Initial Home Price $100,000









—20% $143 $200 $276 $369 $475
—10% $72 $103 $147 $207 $285
0% $33 $49 $70 $100 $145
10% $15 $22 $31 $44 $64
20% $7 $9 $13 $19 $27
Notes: These figures were produced as in Table 4 except that here the constant
term in equation (1) was changed to 0.011 (reflecting a lower, 3%,assumed
steady-state inflation rate) and the cancellation rate wasincreased from 9% per
year to 15% per year (reflecting anassumed faster defection of policyholders).
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